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Posttraumatic flashbacks, consisting of the intrusive re-experiencing of traumatic experiences in the present, have
been more clearly defined for the first time in DSM-5 and have been identified as a unique symptom of
posttraumatic stress disorder in the proposed ICD-11 diagnostic criteria. Relatively little research into flashbacks
has been conducted, however, and new research efforts are required to understand the cognitive and biological
basis of this important symptom. In addition, there is considerable scope for research into how flashbacks
should be assessed and into flashbacks occurring in different contexts, such as psychosis or intensive care.
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W
hen the posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
diagnosis was first introduced into the DSM-
III in 1980, there were several symptoms that
appeared to be distinctive, including frequent intrusive
recollections of the traumatic event and acting or feeling
as though it were happening again (dissociative flash-
backs). It is now evident that frequent intrusive recollections
of stressful and unpleasant events, many of them traumatic,
are found in most forms of psychopathology (Brewin,
Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). Instead, evidence is
gradually accumulating that it is the reliving in the present
that distinguishes intrusive memories in PTSD from those
in other disorders (Brewin, 2014), and this insight has
been incorporated in proposed revisions to the PTSD diag-
nosis for ICD-11 (Maercker et al., 2013). Despite these
developments, understanding of traumatic flashbacks re-
mains limited, offering opportunities for new research.
Pierre Janet, one of the first traumatologists, wrote
extensively about how memories of traumatic experiences
are dissociated or split off from normal consciousness,
resulting in powerful and uncontrollable re-enactments
of the events (Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1989).
Frequently remarked characteristics of this traumatic
re-experiencing in PTSD are its involuntary and uncontroll-
able nature, the strong sensory impressions, and the sense
of ‘‘nowness’’ or of the event occurring in the present
(Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers, Hackmann, &
Michael, 2004), phenomena that can be equally observed
in children with posttraumatic conditions (McKinnon,
Nixon, & Brewer, 2008; Meiser-Stedman, Dalgleish, Smith,
Yule, & Glucksman, 2007). The sense of nowness also
distinguishes involuntary memories in PTSD from the
involuntary memories reported by depressed patients or
individuals who were exposed to trauma without devel-
oping PTSD (Birrer, Michael, & Munsch, 2007; Reynolds
& Brewin, 1998).
Re-experiencing trauma memories in the present is
predictive of the course of the disorder over and above
the effects of initial symptom levels (Kleim, Ehlers, &
Glucksman, 2007; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005)
and decreases with successful treatment (Hackmann,
Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004; Speckens, Ehlers,
Hackmann, & Clark, 2006). Moreover, specifically ad-
dressing flashbacks in therapy appears to contribute to
better outcomes (Nijdam, Baas, Olff, & Gersons, 2013).
Although this form of memory may represent a normal
short-term response to trauma exposure, and may occa-
sionally be encountered in other disorders (for example,
where there is a trauma history), empirical studies confirm
that continuing to experience flashbacks appears to be a
specific indicator of PTSD (Bryant, O’Donnell, Creamer,
McFarlane, & Silove, 2011).
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Defining flashbacks
Lack of any formal definition of flashbacks or dissocia-
tive re-experiencing resulted in uncertainty about whether
the term should be reserved for extreme episodes in which
individuals completely lose contact with their surround-
ings for periods of minutes or more, or whether they
should include all intrusive memories that are accom-
panied by a sense of reliving the event in the present, even
if only fleeting. Both DSM-5 and the proposed ICD-11
PTSD criteria have now opted for the more inclusive
definition in which flashbacks are seen as existing on
a continuum between these two extremes. This is an
important step forward which will enable researchers to
communicate their findings more effectively.
Flashbacks or ordinary autobiographical
memories?
Although some researchers regard flashbacks as no dif-
ferent in principle from other autobiographical memories
(Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008), clinical observations
are supported by studies that explicitly contrast flashback
or reliving experiences with ordinary autobiographical
memories for the same event. In an initial study, Hellawell
and Brewin had PTSD patients write a detailed narrative
of their traumatic event. They then defined a flashback for
them as follows: ‘‘A type of memory that you experience as
markedly different from those memories of the event that
you can retrieve at will. The difference might be a marked
sense of a reliving of the traumatic experience(s). Some
report complete reliving, whereas others report more
momentary or partial reliving of perhaps just one aspect
of the original experience. For some, flashback memories
take them by surprise or swamp their mind. Finally, some
report a sense of time-distortion and, for example, react
to the flashback memory as though it was an event that
was happening in the present.’’ Patients in the study then
went back over their narrative armed with this definition
and distinguished individual words and phrases that had
been accompanied by flashbacks from those that were not
(Hellawell & Brewin, 2002).
Although this may seem like a difficult task to perform
on a narrative that might take 3040 min to write, PTSD
patients did not appear to find it difficult, and the validity
of their categorisations using this method has been
demonstrated on many different measures. For example,
while writing sections that would later be classified as
flashbacks, patients were observed to display significantly
more involuntary motor responses. Patients interrupted
in the middle of these sections to carry out a separate
visuospatial task also performed significantly worse
on the task than patients interrupted during ordinary
memory sections (Hellawell & Brewin, 2002). Subsequent
studies have shown that flashback sections are rated as
more negative and arousing (Brewin, Huntley, & Whalley,
2012); are accompanied by increases in heart rate (Chou,
La Marca, Steptoe, & Brewin, Manuscript submitted for
publication); and also contain more sensory words,
mentions of death, and the core PTSD emotions of fear,
helplessness, and horror (Hellawell & Brewin, 2004). Like
the real-life situations PTSD patients encounter, the same
words and phrases tend to elicit flashbacks repeatedly,
but not invariably*flashback elicitation is a probabilistic
rather than a predictable process (Brewin et al., 2012).
Development of a neurobiological theory of
flashbacks
It is likely that the scientific investigation of flashbacks
will benefit from theories that, like the revised dual
representation model (DRT: Brewin et al., 2010), relate
clinical observations to established brain pathways and
make specific predictions about the neural basis of this
type of memory. The utility of such models is likely to
depend on the success with which they can integrate
evidence from conditioning, autobiographical memory,
and imaging studies with clinical observations.
There is now a considerable quantity of evidence
supporting the idea that flashbacks depend on the
involvement of an involuntary perceptual memory system
that is distinct from ordinary episodic memory (Brewin,
2014). Normal episodic memory is thought to depend on
focussing conscious attention onto objects and scenes
such that, by virtue of sharing the same location in space,
individual features are bound together to create a stable,
contextualised representation that can be retrieved
or inhibited at will (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). During
traumatic events, however, attention tends to be restricted
and focused on the main source of danger, so that sensory
elements from the wider scene encoded by the perceptual
memory system will be less effectively bound together,
producing fragmented and poorly contextualised mem-
ories that are difficult to control. Laboratory research has
shown that such unattended patterns or events, providing
they are sufficiently novel, produce long-lasting memory
traces. The existence of these traces can be detected, for
example, through facilitation or negative priming effects
on re-presentation of the stimuli, even though a memory
of the original pattern cannot be deliberately retrieved
(DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996).
Encoding under acute stress
According to the revised DRT, flashbacks depend on a
stress-related excess of activity in the dorsal visual stream,
which is specialised for creating images of the environ-
ment from a first-person perspective that can be used,
among other things, to direct immediate motor responses
to threat. High levels of stress also lead to a corresponding
reduction of activity in the ventral visual stream and
medial temporal lobe, where the elements of objects
and scenes are normally bound together and encoded
in an abstract form that enables them to be identified,
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manipulated, and related to past experience. The result
is poorly contextualised, fragmented images and scenes
that when triggered by trauma reminders are experienced
as flashbacks. Consistent with this, acute stress has been
found to impair performance on spatial learning tasks
dependent on medial temporal lobe processing, both in
healthy individuals (Meyer, Smeets, Giesbrecht, Quaedflieg,
& Merckelbach, 2013) and PTSD patients (Smith, Burgess,
Brewin, & King, 2015).
It is interesting to speculate about the intensity of stress
that would lead to an opposite pattern of activity in the
visual streams (and possibly in other sensory processing
streams) sufficient to produce flashbacks. A candidate is
panic attacks, which are a common occurrence during the
traumatic event in individuals who subsequently develop
PTSD (Joscelyne, McLean, Drobny, & Bryant, 2012).
In turn, there is evidence that flashbacks are involved in
the maintenance of orthostatic panic, that is, panic upon
standing, which is a key complaint among traumatised
Cambodian refugees (Hinton et al., 2010).
Neuroimaging studies
Unlike standard models of autobiographical memory,
which predict that powerful and vivid memories should be
associated with additional activity in medial temporal lobe
structures such as the hippocampus, dual representation
theory predicts that flashbacks should be associated with
increased activity in motor areas, insula, and amygdala,
but reduced medial temporal lobe activity. In one study,
subjective flashback intensity was correlated with regional
cerebral blood flow in 11 PTSD patients (Osuch et al.,
2001). They observed flashback-related increases in left
inferior frontal cortex and bilateral insula, and flashback-
related decreases in right medial temporal and right
ventral stream structures such as fusiform cortex. Echoing
these results, a study using Hellawell and Brewin’s (2002)
technique for distinguishing flashbacks and ordinary
episodic memories found that flashbacks were associated
with increased activation in sensory and motor areas
including the insula, precentral gyrus, supplementary
motor area, and mid-occipital cortex, but with decreased
activation in a medial temporal area, the parahippocam-
pal gyrus (Whalley et al., 2013). Together with evidence
that patients reporting more flashbacks have reduced
brain volume in areas of the visual ventral stream (Kroes,
Whalley, Rugg, & Brewin, 2011), these studies provide
tantalising suggestions that flashbacks are supported by
patterns of neural activity that distinguish them from
ordinary autobiographical memories.
Future research
Assessment of flashbacks
An unanswered question is whether flashbacks are
currently assessed in the most appropriate way. As they
are typically a response to an internal or external cue,
questionnaire items about their frequency in the past week
or month may not be the most accurate method of
assessing them. Apart from the fact that retrospective
judgments are often not very reliable (Priebe et al., 2013),
high levels of avoidance may temporarily be suppressing
these symptoms. One possibility is to ask a more specific
question about whether individuals would experience
flashbacks if they allowed themselves to fully remember
the event or confront reminders of it. We also know little
about what patients understand by typical questions such
as ‘‘Have you ever suddenly acted or felt as if the event(s)
was happening again?’’, and whether different forms of
wording would elicit more accurate answers.
Underlying mechanisms
In addition to investigating the cognitive and neurobio-
logical basis of flashbacks in PTSD using theories such
as the DRT, it is also likely that flashbacks occur in other
patient groups and could add to our understanding of
the underlying mechanisms. For example, pain flashbacks
have been described in which it is somatic rather than
visual sensations that are repeatedly re-experienced as
though they were happening in the present (Salomons,
Osterman, Gagliese, & Katz, 2004; Whalley, Farmer, &
Brewin, 2007). Frightening delusions and hallucinations,
such as occur in psychosis or to intensive care patients,
can also give rise to traumatic re-experiencing (Berry,
Ford, Jellicoe-Jones, & Haddock, 2013; Gracie, Hardy,
Brewin, & Fornells-Ambrojo, Manuscript submitted for
publication; Wade et al., 2014). Although hallucinations
do not meet current DSM-5 criteria for a traumatic event,
the fact that the person has had a terrifying experience
and developed characteristic symptoms thereafter would
permit a diagnosis of PTSD within ICD-10 or ICD-11.
Towards ICD-11
PTSD, compared to other disorders, is excessively com-
plex to diagnose, and this very complexity is likely to
impede clinical and scientific advances. It makes sense
both to simplify the diagnosis as far as is possible, and to
focus on the mechanisms responsible for key symptoms
that maintain the disorder and are treatment targets
in their own right. Along with this should go more con-
sistent terminology, so that ‘‘involuntary autobiographical
memories’’ (an everyday memory phenomenon), ‘‘intru-
sive memories’’ (involuntary memories with repeated and
usually distressing content, generally associated with
psychological disorders), and ‘‘flashbacks’’ (involuntary
memories involving re-experiencing distressing events in
the present, thought to be specific to PTSD) are not used
interchangeably (Kvavilashvili, 2014).
Under the ICD-11 proposals for the PTSD diagnosis
just six symptoms have been identified (one of them being
flashbacks) that are thought to be the most reliable
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indicators discriminating PTSD from other disorders
(Brewin, Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea, 2009; Maercker
et al., 2013). Preliminary evidence suggests that if the
ICD-11 proposals were implemented, PTSD prevalence
would remain largely unchanged (Morina, Van Emmerik,
Andrews, & Brewin, 2014; Stein et al., 2014; Van Emmerik
& Kamphuis, 2011) although one study of accident
survivors found a lower rate of PTSD under ICD-11
(O’Donnell et al., 2014). All studies so far have found
some evidence of reduced comorbidity with depression
under ICD-11.
These developments have given greater urgency to the
need to understand core symptoms such as flashbacks and
made them a prime target for research. From a cognitive
perspective the vividness and immediacy of the symptom
is interesting as these features are likely to influence a wide
variety of memory judgments, for example, concerning
the veracity of the intrusive images experienced (Brewin
et al., 2012). In addition, their considerable clinical impact
suggests that a focus on this symptom has the potential to
bring about substantial gains in therapeutic efficacy.
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